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The standard of the reasonable person or its equivalent, in general, is 
used in many jurisdictions to determine fault in the form of negligence. 
Although the standard is predominantly objective it is also subjective in 
that the subjective attributes of the person against whom the standard 
applies as well as the subjective circumstances present at the time of 
the delict or tort lend themselves to an objective-subjective application. 
In South African law, before a person can be judged according to the 
standard of the reasonable person, the person must first be held 
accountable. If a person cannot be held accountable, then the standard 
does not apply at all. 
The general standard of the reasonable person cannot be applied to 
children, the elderly, persons with physical disabilities, persons with 
mental impairments or experts. Therefore, depending on the subjective 
attributes of the person against whom the standard is being applied, the 
standard may have to be adjusted accordingly. The general standard of 
the reasonable person would be raised when dealing with experts, for 
instance, and lowered when dealing with persons with physical 
disabilities. 
This contribution considers whether the current application of the 
standard of the reasonable person in South African law is satisfactory 
when applied generally to all persons, no matter their age, experience, 
gender, physical disability and cognitive ability. The application of the 
standard of the reasonable person in South African law is compared to 
the application of the standard of the reasonable person or its 
equivalent in the United Kingdom, the United States of America and 
France. Just as South African law applies the standard of the 
reasonable expert to experts, this contribution explores whether the 
South African law should be developed to use similar adjusted 
standards when dealing with children, the elderly, persons with physical 
disabilities and so on. 
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1  Introduction 
In all the jurisdictions that will be discussed in this contribution, namely 
South Africa, France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, 
the standard of the "reasonable person" or terms equivalent to it is used in 
determining fault in the form of negligence.1 
In a previous contribution,2 the reasons for the choice of the jurisdictions 
mentioned above and the fundamental differences and similarities between 
these legal systems were explained. South African and French law use a 
generalising approach, in that all the elements of a delict must be present 
before liability in delict will follow, whereas in the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America, a system of separate torts is found with the torts 
having their own requirements, the main tort3 being the tort of negligence.4 
It was also explained in this previous contribution5 that there has lately been 
uncertainty surrounding the role of reasonableness in the South African law 
of delict.6 This also applies to the standard of the reasonable person, in that 
it is used not only in determining negligence but also in determining other 
elements of delictual or tort liability.7 In this contribution the focus will be on 
the application of the standard of the reasonable person in determining 
negligence only. 
                                            
 Raheel Ahmed. LLB LLM LLD (University of South Africa). Admitted Attorney, 
Conveyancer and Notary of the High Court of South Africa. Associate Professor, 
Department of Private Law, University of South Africa. Email: ahmedr@unisa.ac.za. 
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6179-2361. This contribution is based on 
material taken from various chapters of my LLD thesis The Explicit and Implicit 
Influence of Reasonableness on the Elements of Delictual Liability. This study was 
made possible as a result of the "Academic Qualification Improvement Programme" 
grant awarded to me by my employer, the University of South Africa. 
1  See Minister of Safety and Security v Carmichele 2004 3 SA 305 (SCA) 325, Sea 
Harvest Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Duncan Dock Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd 2000 1 SA 827 
(SCA) 839-840 (where the courts stated that "the true criterion for determining 
negligence is whether in the particular circumstances the conduct complained of falls 
short of the standard of the reasonable person"), Kruger v Coetzee 1966 2 SA 428 
(A) 430 and Mukheiber v Raath 1999 3 SA 1065 (SCA) 1077 with regard to South 
African law; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 143 and the authority 
cited therein with regard to English law; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
Torts 214 and the authority cited therein with regard to American law, and Galand-
Carval "Liability for Damage Caused by Others" 90-93 as well as the authority cited 
therein with regard to French law. 
2  Ahmed 2019 PELJ 2-5. 
3  The terms "tort" and "delict" are used synonymously. 
4  Ahmed 2019 PELJ 2-5. 
5  Ahmed 2019 PELJ 2. 
6  This current contribution is the fourth contribution in a series of contributions based 
on the influence of reasonableness on the elements of delictual liability. 
7  This will be discussed further in a forthcoming contribution. 
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In the South African law of delict, the standard of the reasonable person and 
the reasonable expert are often encountered in determining negligence.8 
There is, however, as will be pointed out further on,9 a lack of authority in 
general on how the standard should be applied to persons with physical 
disabilities or impairments and the elderly. In spite of this lack of authority, 
it is possible to demarcate the manner in which the standard should be 
applied in South African law by using a common sense approach and taking 
into account how French and Anglo-American law10 apply the standard. 
Furthermore, in South African law it is trite that the reasonable person test 
is applied to a child or minor. French law also applies the equivalent of the 
reasonable person standard albeit in an attenuated form,11 while the other 
jurisdictions discussed in this contribution do not.12 In order to conclude 
whether the application of the general standard of the reasonable person in 
determining negligence in South African law is suitable for all persons (no 
matter their age, gender, disability, impairment etcetera) it is necessary to 
analyse and consider the similarities and differences between South Africa 
and other jurisdictions in the application of the standard of the reasonable 
person (or its equivalent) in determining negligence.13 It is also necessary 
to consider how the standard is adjusted when dealing with children, the 
elderly, persons with physical disabilities, persons with mental impairments 
and experts. 
In South African and French law, when determining fault in the form of 
negligence, the standard of the reasonable person is encountered under the 
element of fault or faute respectively. In English and American law (from 
here on referred to as Anglo-American law), the standard of the reasonable 
person is encountered under the requirement of a "breach of a duty of care", 
in the tort of negligence. The "breach of a duty of care" requirement 
questions whether the actor's conduct strayed from the standard of the 
reasonable person and was negligent.14 
In this contribution the focus will be on the nature of the standard of the 
reasonable person as a yardstick in determining negligence and how this 
                                            
8  See Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 154, 171-172; Neethling and Potgieter Law 
of Delict 169, 173-176; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 237, 269-270; 
Boberg Law of Delict 274, 346.  
9  In para 3.1 below. 
10  The mix of English and American law. 
11  See para 3.4 below.  
12  See para 3.2-3.3 below. 
13  France and the United Kingdom in particular have influenced many legal systems in 
the world. See Van Dam European Tort Law 9. 
14  See Ahmed 2019 THRHR 140-145 as well as the authority cited therein with regard 
to a more detailed explanation of the "duty of care concept". 
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yardstick is adjusted depending on the subjective attributes of the person 
against whom the test is being applied. The tests of reasonable 
foreseeability of harm, reasonable preventability of harm and the 
circumstances present at the time of the alleged wrongdoing as well as 
contributory negligence will not be discussed except in a peripheral manner 
when discussing the nature of the standard of the reasonable person. 
For comparative purposes in this contribution, the base standard of the 
reasonable person was taken to refer to the standard that is applied to a 
gender-neutral adult over eighteen years of age without any physical 
disabilities or mental impairments. To begin with, some general 
observations will be made related to the standard of the reasonable person 
from Anglo-American Common Law. This will be followed by a discussion 
of the adaptation of the base standard of the reasonable person in South 
African, Anglo-American and French law, depending on the subjective 
attributes of the actor. Thereafter, a summary of the comparative 
conclusions will be provided, concluding with some possible 
recommendations for South African law. 
2  General observations related to the standard of the 
reasonable person from Common Law  
The concept of the bonus pater familias (the good family father)15 originated 
in Roman law and is synonymous with the term, "the reasonable person" or 
its equivalent as used nowadays. The reasonable person standard is 
normative,16 flexible and value-based.17 Members of the community 
generally assume that fellow members will comply with a "uniform standard 
of conduct" and a member's conduct must conform to the "ideals and 
standards of a particular community".18 The standard has been criticised19 
inter alia for being favourable to men20 and specific classes of persons. 
When the standard is interpreted by adjudicators, there is a tendency at 
times for them to reflect their subjective views in judgments.21 Nevertheless, 
as a standard it is useful and illustrates the law's devotion to justice.22 In 
                                            
15  As used in the French law of delict.  
16  Miller and Perry 2012 NYU L Rev 323. 
17  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 237, 243. 
18  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 237. 
19  See Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person. 
20  See Bender 1988 J Leg Ed 3ff. Bender (20-25) traces how initially the concept was 
formulated in the masculine form, illustrating bias. Also see Martin 1994 Anglo-Am L 
Rev 334, 342-345; Mullender 2005 MLR 682. 
21  Mullender 2005 MLR 683. 
22  Mullender 2005 MLR 681-682. 
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trying to establish exactly what the reasonable person standard is, a number 
of academic writers' views will be referred to. 
Artosi23 states that the reasonable person is a well-known, fictional, abstract 
character supposed to be endowed with the morals, virtues and reasoning 
ability which society expects from its members. Hart24 submits that the 
standard of reasonableness "created space for ordinary moral reasoning". 
Zipursky25 submits that the standard of the reasonable person is used as a 
decision-making tool for adjudicators, allowing them to make determinations 
of reasonableness with ease. Weinrib26 submits that the reasonable person 
standard outlines the limit between the defendant's freedom to act as he or 
she wishes and "the plaintiff's interest in security by treating certain risks as 
unreasonable." Ripstein27 states that the standard encompasses the idea of 
fair terms with regard to social interactions where there are dividing risks 
that accompany everyday acceptable human conduct. Generally, a person 
who fails to meet the required benchmark of acceptable behaviour may be 
held liable for the harm caused to others.28 
According to Holmes,29 the community generally expects individuals to 
forgo their peculiarities to a certain extent. Prosser,30 along the same lines, 
submits that one who lives in a community must conform to the community’s 
standards and be responsible for the harm or loss. There is no leniency or 
excuse for not applying the standard of the reasonable person where a 
particular person is unintelligent, emotionally unstable, uneducated and 
easily excitable or has any other personal idiosyncrasies.31 
Moran's32 views on the various understandings of reasonableness in the 
reasonable person standard are rather interesting. After studying the role of 
                                            
23  Artosi "Reasonableness" 69. Also see Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 169-
176. 
24  Hart Concept of Law 132-133. See Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 281. 
25  Zipursky 2015 U Pa L Rev 2149. 
26  Weinrib Tort Law 47. See Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 174. 
27  Ripstein "Reasonable Persons in Private Law" 255, 258. 
28  See Zipursky 2004 Fordham L Rev 1929, who refers to Ripstein's concept of the 
reasonable person as "objective and value laden". Ripstein holds views similar to 
those of Keating 1996 Stan L Rev 329-332, 337-341, which draws on Rawls' idea of 
reasonableness. 
29  Holmes Common Law 86, referred to by Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 
162. 
30  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 153, referred to by Moran 
Rethinking the Reasonable Person 163. 
31  See Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 241. 
32  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person. Extensive references to the views of 
Moran in this part of the contribution as well as under para 3.2 below reflect the fact 
that she is the only researcher, as far as can be determined, who has written in depth 
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the reasonable person standard extensively in a number of common law 
jurisdictions, she submits that the reasonable person is regarded as an 
ordinary, normal, human being. His or her conduct must be "accepted as 
normal and general by other members of the community in similar 
circumstances."33 Moran34 makes a distinction between normal and 
reasonable behaviour. The distinction is irrelevant in instances where 
normal behaviour is considered reasonable behaviour. She35 points out that 
in practice, the reasonable person standard is fraught with different 
understandings of what is normal, natural and ordinary. Moran36 submits 
that in practice it is normal and thus reasonable for young boys to be 
inattentive to their own and others’ safety, while with young girls this is not 
normal, and it would therefore be unreasonable for a young girl to be 
imprudent. Moran37 refers to Gilligan,38 who found substantial gender 
differences in moral reasoning, whereby "girls use a voice of relation, of care 
and connection, which differs from boys' emphasis on abstract rules and … 
ethics of justice."39 A woman,40 young girl41 and a mentally impaired 
                                            
on this topic and, in addition, her views are persuasive. Professor Elspeth Reid (from 
the University of Edinburgh) advised me from the outset that any research 
undertaken on the reasonable person or reasonableness must include material from 
Moran's monograph. 
33  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 133. Moran (133) quotes Flemming Law 
of Torts 119-120. See the later edition, Sappideen and Vines Fleming's The Law of 
Torts 128-129. See further authority cited by Moran 134 fn. 15 with reference to 
customs and the community. 
34  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 7. 
35  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 9, 17. 
36  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 9.  
37  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 178. 
38  Gilligan In a Different Voice 1982. 
39  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 178 in reference to Gilligan's findings. 
40  See the extensive authority cited by Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 199 
fn. 1. Moran (199-231) points out that in a criminal context with regard to provocation, 
self-defence and sexual assault, the standard of reasonableness applies differently 
to women (also see Donovan and Wildman 1981 Loy LA L Rev 435).  
41  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 110-111 and Welke Recasting American 
Liberty 94 refer to Michigan Central Railroad v Hassenyer 48 Mich 205, 209-210 (SC 
1882) involving the death of a thirteen year-old who was killed when an engine 
backed up as she was crossing the railway track. Cooley J's instructions to the jury 
was that however negligent the railroad company had been, the jury must consider 
the standard of ordinary care that she should have had with regard to herself. To 
Cooley J, care referred to being more cautious than a male ‒ "a woman would be 
likely to be more prudent, careful and particular in many positions and in the 
performance of many duties than a man would. She would, for example, be more 
vigilant and indefatigable in her care of a helpless child; she would be more particular 
to keep within the limits of absolute safety when the dangers which threatened were 
such as only great strength and courage could venture to encounter." Moran (111-
125), in support of the unequal treatment, refers to a number of cases highlighting 
that the reasonableness of conduct of girls is judged more harshly than that of boys.  
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person42 are held to a harsher standard of reasonableness.43 A more 
relaxed standard is, however, generally recommended for the elderly 
members of the community.44 
In respect of a mentally impaired person,45 Moran46 explains that the 
impairment is regarded as an abnormality, an "idiosyncrasy or peculiarity". 
He or she is not regarded as a full member of the community. The mentally 
impaired are judged according to the uniform standard of the reasonable 
person despite their cognitive and intellectual shortcomings.47 Moran refers 
to the following reasons supplied for applying this uniform standard to the 
mentally impaired: that it is in line with the idea of the general welfare of the 
community; it deters dangerous conduct;48 even though it does impose a 
form of strict liability, it can be justified as the conduct involves heightened 
risk and is deemed unreasonably risky conduct;49 on grounds of equality 
and fairness, the victim who sustains harm as a result of the defendant's 
mental impairment should be compensated;50 and it would be burdensome 
for the courts to try and establish the extent of a person's mental capacity.51 
                                            
42  In Anglo-American law. 
43  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 14. 
44  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 24-26, 138. She refers to Barett III 1984 
J Marshall L Rev 873, who proposes a relaxed standard for the elderly. Also see 
para 3.4 below in respect of French law with regard to a person over the age of 
seventy years, and para 3.3 below in respect of American law where contributory 
negligence cannot be applied to an institutionalised elderly person.  
45  In terms of Anglo-American Common law. 
46  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 9, 147-154 illustrates how historically 
women were also not considered as full citizens. Their liberty was restrained and 
they were generally considered the weaker sex. Moran (183) refers to Vogel "Is 
Citizenship Gender-specific?" 62 where historically the following groups inter alia 
lacked legal capacity: children; women; the insane; slaves and serfs. Certain 
religious groups such as Jews and Catholics as well as certain ethnic groups were 
denied full legal rights and membership. Moran (184-197) refers to the inequality 
applied to people from different racial groups and people with different financial 
standings. 
47 Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 13. However, in South African law, the 
standard is applied only if the person can be held accountable. See para 3.1 below. 
48  See the discussion by Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 31-39 with regard 
to the deterrence and compensation rationale. 
49 Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 41-42, 45. 
50  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 137-138 refers to Fleming Law of Torts 
126 (see later edition Sappideen and Vines Fleming's The Law of Torts 132) citing 
Adamson v Motor Vehicle Insurance Trust 1957 58 WALR 56 (SC) and Alexander 
and Szas 1967 Notre Dame L Rev 26, who state that mental illness is a deviation 
"from normal moral and social standards". One must, however, take into account the 
year in which the contribution was written by latter authors. 
51  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 28. 
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Moran52 distinguishes between a person without objectively viewed mental 
or physical impairments and a person with physical disabilities. To illustrate 
by way of an example, she refers to the English case, Vaughan v Menlove.53 
In this case, the defendant built a hay rick close to the boundary of his 
property. He was informed on numerous occasions, over a period of time, 
that the manner in which it was built was dangerous but he nonetheless 
decided to "chance it". The hay subsequently caught alight, spread to the 
plaintiff's land and caused damage to two of the plaintiff's cottages. The 
defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that he was acting to the best of 
his cognitive abilities. The court applied an objective standard of a man of 
ordinary prudence, dismissing his subjective cognitive shortcomings. 
Moran54 refers to the English case, Roberts v Ramsbottom,55 where the 
driver suffered a stroke while driving and was found negligent even though 
the court acknowledged that he was not able to appreciate that he should 
have stopped. This came close to strict liability, which contradicts fault 
liability of the tort of negligence itself.56 She57 points out, however, that this 
was revisited by the Court of Appeal in Mansfield v Weetabix,58 where the 
court took into account the driver's hypoglycaemic state which he was 
unaware of and found him not to have been negligent. 
Moran59 illustrates that common sense reasoning is applied in assuming 
what is normal, natural and reasonable. She60 submits that there is a 
connection between the freedom to act, blameworthiness and prevention of 
harm. She61 points out that Rawls, Holmes and Honoré all require that the 
actor has the capacity to prevent harm. Normal, natural behaviour is 
considered as non-culpable conduct. 
By applying the standard of the reasonable person, Moran62 submits that 
sometimes there is inequality which does not adhere to corrective justice. 
She63 does not propose the adoption of a subjective approach, which in her 
                                            
52  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 19. 
53  Vaughan v Menlove 1837 3 Bing NC 468; 132 ER 490 (CP). 
54  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 20-21. 
55  Roberts v Ramsbottom 1980 1 All ER 7 (QBD). 
56  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 39, however, refers to the idea that the 
reasonable person standard does in a way apply strict liability as the person's 
shortcomings are disregarded.  
57  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 22. 
58  Mansfield v Weetabix 1988 1 WLR 1263. 
59  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 131-135. 
60  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 175. 
61  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 177, 241-248. 
62  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable person 11, 52, 56. 
63  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 206. 
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opinion would result in discrimination. She64 submits that reasonableness is 
interpreted as ordinariness with reference to customary norms. This is 
problematic, as what is regarded as ordinary or customary leads to 
discrimination inter alia against persons with mental impairments, girls and 
women. The result, she submits, is that the standard "operates as an 
(unjustifiable) standard of ordinariness rather than as a (justifiable) standard 
of reasonableness".65 In order to ensure that the reasonableness standard 
lives up to its egalitarian promise, she proposes that the objective 
reasonableness standard be understood as "appropriate attentiveness to 
the interests of others" and unreasonable conduct as "culpable indifference 
to the interests of others".66 In short, she proposes removing the person 
from the standard as her answer to the objective egalitarian approach.67 
She applies her approach to Mansfield v Weetabix,68 stating that the 
defendant was not indifferent to the interests of others, and his conduct was 
not blameworthy or negligent.69 She applies the same approach to Roberts 
v Ramsbottom,70 concluding that due to the sudden stroke suffered by the 
defendant, he was not indifferent to the interests of others. Therefore, his 
conduct was not objectively unreasonable.71 In Vaughan v Menlove,72 
where the defendant claimed limited intelligence, his conduct showed self-
preference for his own interests and indifference to others' interests, which 
was culpable.73 
In response to Moran's proposal Mullender74 submits that she 
underestimates the tools available in negligence law which would assist in 
the adaptation of the law according to her proposal. In Mansfield v 
Weetabix,75 Mullender76 submits that the defendant did not act, hence he 
was not a wrongdoer. In terms of corrective justice, the defendant should 
not be held liable. Mullender77 submits that there is no problem with the 
                                            
64  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 286. 
65  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 13. 
66  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 304. 
67  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 316. 
68  Mansfield v Weetabix 1988 1 WLR 1263. 
69  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 309. 
70  Roberts v Ramsbottom 1980 1 All ER 7 (QBD). 
71  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 287. 
72  Vaughan v Menlove 1837 3 Bing NC 468; 132 ER 490 (CP). 
73  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 310. 
74  Mullender 2005 MLR 694-695. 
75  Mansfield v Weetabix 1988 1 WLR 1263. 
76  Mullender 2005 MLR 688. 
77  Mullender 2005 MLR 688. 
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concept of reasonableness itself but that there is a failure on the part of 
some adjudicators to dispense justice within the scope of reasonableness. 
Moran78 most certainly points out the inequality of the application of the 
standard of the reasonable person. One can also agree with Mullender's 
view79 that there is no problem with the concept of reasonableness but that 
the problem lies with the adjudicator's interpretation of it. 
From the general observations made above, it is apparent that there are 
some broad strokes one can make when it comes to understanding the 
adjudicators' application of the standard of the reasonable person. A 
person's peculiarities and cognitive shortcomings may not be considered as 
mitigating factors when applying the standard, but a physical impairment or 
condition which one is unaware of, such as in the case of Mansfield v 
Weetabix,80 may result in the exoneration of liability. Children and the 
elderly, due to their age-related cognitive abilities, may be held to a more 
relaxed standard of reasonableness. In Anglo-American law as well as in 
French law,81 the conduct of a mentally impaired person is judged according 
to the standard of the reasonable person despite his or her cognitive and 
intellectual shortcomings. Moran points out82 that there is a distinction 
between normal, ordinary and reasonable behaviour. Women and young 
girls are generally held to a harsher standard of reasonableness than men 
and young boys. From these general observations we can now look more 
closely at the adaptation of the standard of the reasonable person, 
depending on the specific subjective attributes of the alleged wrongdoer or 
actor in Anglo-American, South African and French law. 
3  The adaptation of the base standard of the reasonable 
person depending on the subjective attributes of the 
actor 
3.1  South Africa (South African law) 
In South African law, the concept of "accountability" is a prerequisite for 
fault.83 The actor must have the mental capacity to be at fault at the time of 
                                            
78  Above in the preceding paragraphs. 
79  Above in the preceding paragraphs. 
80  Mansfield v Weetabix 1988 1 WLR 1263. 
81  See paras 3.2-3.4 below. 
82  In the preceding paragraphs above. 
83  Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 157-159; Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 
139; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 226; Burchell Principles of Delict 
84; Visser "Compensation for Pecuniary Loss" 1122. 
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the commission of the alleged delict. The actor must understand the 
difference between what is right and wrong and thereafter act in accordance 
with such an understanding.84 An investigation into subjective factors 
relating to the actor, such as his or her level of knowledge, state of mind, 
level of maturity, experience and general overall mental development at the 
time of the commission of the alleged delict are considered.85 Under certain 
circumstances children,86 mentally impaired, emotionally distressed,87 
intoxicated88 and provoked89 persons may lack accountability.90 
According to sections 7 and 11 of the Child Justice Act,91 a child from birth 
to nine years of age is culpae incapax and cannot be held accountable.92 A 
child from twelve to fourteen years of age can be held accountable unless 
the contrary is proven, and a child between fourteen and eighteen years of 
age is presumed to be culpae capax (accountable) unless the contrary is 
proven. In terms of common law, a child below the age of seven is culpae 
incapax and a child between seven and fourteen years of age is culpae 
capax.93 A child between fourteen and eighteen years of age is culpae 
capax depending on the circumstances of the case.94 Jansen and 
                                            
84  Weber v Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1983 1 SA 381 (A) 389; Neethling 
and Potgieter Law of Delict 131; Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 139; Burchell 
Principles of Delict 83; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 226. 
85  Weber v Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1983 1 SA 381 (A) 390; Van der 
Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 226-227; cf Burchell Principles of Delict 83. 
86  Boberg Law of Delict 659. 
87  See S v Campher 1987 1 SA 940 (A); S v Laubscher 1998 1 SA 163 (A); Neethling 
and Potgieter Law of Delict 159; Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 142. 
88  See S v Chretien 1981 1 SA 1097 (A), where the accused was found not guilty of 
murder and assault as a result of being in such a state of intoxication that it rendered 
him unaccountable and lacking fault in the form of intention. Also see Neethling and 
Potgieter Law of Delict 159; Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 143; Van der Walt 
and Midgley Principles of Delict 227. If a person takes an intoxicating substance 
before he or she becomes intoxicated, thereafter committing a delict, he or she may 
still be held liable as a result of his or her prior act while he or she was still 
accountable. 
89  Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 159; Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 143-
144. 
90  Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 158-159; Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 
140; Visser "Compensation for Pecuniary Loss" 1122-1123. 
91  Child Justice Act 75 of 2008. 
92  Section 4 of the Child Justice Amendment Bill of 2019 is still to become operational, 
but it states that a child under twelve years of age does not have criminal capacity. 
93  See Weber v Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1983 1 SA 381 (A) and Eskom 
Holdings Ltd v Hendricks 2005 5 SA 503 (SCA), where the children lacked 
accountability on the basis that the children were between seven and fourteen years 
of age and had not acted in accordance with an appreciation of the difference 
between what was right and what was wrong. 
94  See Weber v Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1983 1 SA 381 (A) 389, 399; 
Jones v Santam Bpk 1965 2 SA 542 (A) 552-554; Neethling and Potgieter Law of 
Delict 158; Visser "Compensation for Pecuniary Loss"1123; Loubser and Midgley 
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Neethling95 submit that the Child Justice Act applies to the accountability of 
children with regard to crimes. The common law position still applies to 
delictual liability.96 
It is settled that the "reasonable person" test applies to children who may 
be held accountable.97 Previously our courts used to follow the "reasonable 
child" test, which took into account the youthfulness of the child wrongdoer, 
but the approach took a turn in Jones v Santam Bpk,98 when the court stated 
that in all cases, the objective "reasonable person" test must first be applied. 
Thereafter it must be determined whether the child can be held responsible 
for his or her conduct; that is, whether the child can be held accountable, 
taking into account subjective factors relating to the child.99 In Roxa v 
Mtshayi100 the court stated that first it must be ascertained whether the child 
is accountable, taking subjective factors into account and thereafter 
determine negligence. Therefore, under the concept of accountability the 
particular child's subjective age, level of maturity and general mental 
development etcetera at the time of the alleged delict are taken into 
consideration and thereafter tested against the objective standard of the 
reasonable person.101 The harshness of applying the reasonable person 
standard to a child is somewhat alleviated by the rules of accountability. 
This approach was endorsed in Weber v Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy 
Bpk102 and in Eskom Holdings Ltd v Hendricks.103 The standard of the 
reasonable person that is applied to children in South Africa has been 
criticised.104 Neethling and Potgieter105 point out that a noteworthy criticism 
is that the reasonable child test is a more suitable standard for a child 
                                            
Law of Delict 141-142 discussion of Weber and Eskom Holdings Ltd; Van der Walt 
and Midgley Principles of Delict 227. 
95  Jansen and Neethling 2017 THRHR 474. 
96  See Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 140-142; Van der Walt and Midgley 
Principles of Delict 227, who refer to the common law position with regard to the 
delictual liability of children. Also see Jansen and Neethling 2017 THRHR 474-482. 
97  See in general Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 171-173; Loubser and Midgley 
Law of Delict 135-136 and their discussion of Haffajee v South African Railways and 
Harbours 1981 3 SA 1062 (W); Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 273-
274; Burchell Principles of Delict 90-91. 
98  Jones v Santam Bpk 1965 2 SA 542 (A) 551-552. 
99  The decision in Jones v Santam 1965 2 SA 542 (A) has been criticised for in effect 
determining negligence before accountability. However, in Roxa v Mtshayi 1975 3 
SA 761 (A) 765-766 accountability was correctly determined before negligence (see 
Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 171-173). 
100  Roxa v Mtshayi 1975 3 SA 761 (A) 765-766. 
101  See Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 171. 
102  Weber v Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1983 1 SA 381 (A) 400. 
103  Eskom Holdings Ltd v Hendricks 2005 5 SA 503 (SCA) 511-512. 
104  See Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 144 fn 109 and the authority cited therein. 
105  Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 172. 
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because even though a child may be accountable, the child's conduct 
cannot realistically be measured against that of an adult.106 
In South African law, if a person has a mental impairment or sustains severe 
emotional distress and cannot distinguish right from wrong or can but is 
unable to act in accordance with the appreciation of that distinction at the 
time of the delict, he or she is culpae incapax. The person does not act with 
fault and cannot be held delictually liable.107 The position in South African 
law, as will be explained further below, is markedly different from that in 
French and Anglo-American law.108 
Van der Walt and Midgley109 point out that there is a lack of authority on 
whether subjective physical attributes of the person such as a person’s 
disabilities play a part in determining negligence. However, with reference 
to common law Van der Walt and Midgley110 state that the general approach 
is to consider the physical disability in adjusting the (base) standard of the 
reasonable person. The conduct of the person with a physical disability must 
still be reasonable in the light of his or her knowledge of the disability.111 A 
person who is visually impaired and aware of it will be found negligent if he 
or she drives a car on the street and causes harm to another.112 
From a cursory reading of textbooks on delict, there is also a lack of 
authority on how the standard of the reasonable person should be applied 
to the elderly. It may be assumed, though, that in terms of a common sense 
approach, the base standard could be adjusted and perhaps lowered when 
applied to the elderly in view of their age, physical and cognitive abilities. 
However, along the same lines as the person with a physical disability, the 
conduct of the elderly person must still be reasonable in the light of his age, 
physical and cognitive abilities. 
                                            
106  Also see Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 173-174 with reference to different 
outcomes reached (dealing with children) in Eskom Holdings Ltd v Hendricks 2005 
5 SA 503 (SCA) and Hafajee v South African Railways and Harbours 1981 3 SA 
1062 (W). 
107  Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 158; Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 140-
143; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 227. Also see S v Campher 1987 
1 SA 940 (A) with regard to emotional and mental distress; S v Chretien 1981 1 SA 
1097 (A) with regard to severe intoxication. 
108  See paras 3.2-3.4 below with regard to French and Anglo-American law. 
109  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 241. 
110  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 241. 
111  R v Verster 1952 2 SA 231 (A) 234; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 
241. 
112  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 241. 
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The reasonable person standard in South African law, generally, does not 
relate to a specific gender113 or to a particular physical characteristics of a 
person.114 It is not expected of the person to be exceptionally skilled, 
developed or too careful, nor is the person underdeveloped, thoughtless or 
reckless.115 The reasonable person test is flexible and adaptable in that the 
courts adapt the standard depending on the circumstances of each case. 
At times the adjudicator may raise the standard in instances where the 
defendant has expertise in a certain field.116 For example, the conduct of a 
doctor would be tested against the standard of the reasonable doctor and 
not against the standard of the reasonable person.117 The "reasonable 
expert" test is similar to the reasonable person test, although a reasonable 
measure of the particular expertise is applied.118 The reasonable expert test 
does not expect the person to have the highest level of skill and expertise 
but rather the "general level of skill and diligence possessed and exercised 
at the time by members of the branch of the professional to which the 
practitioner belongs."119 The test is based on the acquired necessary 
knowledge as well as the exercise of the necessary skill, care and 
diligence.120 Besides the application of the standard of the reasonable 
expert, the court will still look at the surrounding circumstances of the case 
and then decide what conduct was reasonably to be expected in the 
                                            
113  Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 169-170. 
114  Weber v Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1983 1 SA 381 (A) 410-411. 
115  See in general Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 169-170; Loubser and Midgley 
Law of Delict 154; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 239. Van den 
Heever JA in Herschel v Mrupe 1954 3 SA 464 (A) 490 stated that the concept of 
the "bonus paterfamilias is not that of a timorous faintheart always in trepidation lest 
he or others suffer some injury; on the contrary, he ventures out into the world, 
engages in affairs and takes reasonable chances. He takes reasonable precautions 
to protect his person and property and expects others to do likewise." Also see 
iMvula Quality Protection v Loureiro 2013 3 SA 407 (SCA) 416. 
116  Scott 2014 De Jure 390. 
117  See Van Wyk v Lewis 1924 AD 438 456; Lymbrey v Jefferies 1925 AD 236; 
Esterhuizen v Administrator, Transvaal 1957 3 SA 710 (T) 723; Louwrens v Oldwage 
2006 1 All SA 197 (SCA) 207; Medi-Clinic v Vermeulen 2015 1 SA 241 (SCA) 243 
with respect to the reasonable doctor test. 
118  See Neethling 2002 SALJ 287; Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 173-176; 
Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 171; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 
269-270; Boberg Law of Delict 346. 
119  Van Wyk v Lewis 1924 AD 438, 444; Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 147; 
Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 171-172; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of 
Delict 269. 
120  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 269. 
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circumstances.121 The same standard of competence is required of persons 
with similar skills, irrespective of their experience.122 
Where there is a lack of experience, for example in the case of a learner 
driver who does not have the knowledge or skill of an experienced driver, 
the lack of experience may not count in his or her favour and he or she may 
not be excused or treated more leniently because of the lack of 
experience.123 Even though beginners or novices are encouraged to 
develop and apply their knowledge, skill and experience in their occupation 
or profession, if their lack of skill and experience poses a danger to others, 
the standard of the reasonable person may not be lowered.124 Where the 
beginner driver creates an appreciable risk of harm, it is expected of him or 
her to act with the same level of proficiency as an experienced driver.125 
However, a novice golfer126 or young, inexperienced teacher127 will not be 
expected to display the same level of knowledge and skill as that of the 
experienced teacher or golfer. It is apparent that the base standard of the 
reasonable person is applied where the risk of harm is appreciable. In 
instances where a person undertakes an activity which requires a certain 
level of skill and knowledge and that person knows or ought to know that he 
or she lacks the skill or knowledge but still undertakes the activity, the 
person may be found negligent.128 
3.2  The United Kingdom (English law) 
3.2.1  The tort of negligence 
As already mentioned,129 Anglo-American tort law comprises of a system of 
a number of torts. There is the tort of negligence and numerous intentional 
torts. For the purpose of this contribution, the tort of negligence is of 
importance. In the tort of negligence, the standard of care is generally tested 
objectively against the reasonable person,130 also referred to as the ordinary 
                                            
121  Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 175; Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 172. 
122  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 269. 
123  Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 171. 
124  See Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 271. 
125  See Simon's Town Municipality v Dews 1993 1 SA 191 (A); Loubser and Midgley 
Law of Delict 171. 
126  Clark v Welsh 1976 3 SA 484 (A) 486; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 
272. 
127  Jacobs v Chairman, Governing Body, Rhodes High School 2011 1 SA 160 (WCC) 
[73, 76]; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 272. 
128  Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 171. 
129  In para 1 above. 
130  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 143; Jones "Negligence" 553. 
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man or woman on the "Clapham omnibus".131 The reasonable person is not 
exceptionally skilled or inexperienced,132 nor is he or she extraordinary 
careful or extraordinarily vigilant.133 Lord Macmillan in Glasgow Corporation 
v Muir134 stated that the standard "eliminates the personal equation and is 
independent of the idiosyncrasies of the particular person whose conduct is 
in question." 
It is trite law that the standard of care varies with certain types of defendants 
such as children, persons with disabilities or impairments, or professionals. 
In respect of professionals such as doctors, the standard applied is the 
reasonable, skilled, competent, professional doctor.135 In assessing the 
standard of reasonableness of professionals, unrealistic standards, 
knowledge or skill must not be expected of them.136 Bolam v Friern 
Hospital137 (hereinafter referred to as "Bolam") is authority138 for the 
approach applied to professionals, which is the "standard of the ordinary 
skilled man exercising and professing to have that special skill." In this well-
known case it was held that "a doctor who had acted in accordance with a 
practice accepted at the time as proper by a responsible body of medical 
opinion skilled in the particular form of treatment in question was not guilty 
of negligence merely because there was a body of competent professional 
opinion which might adopt a different technique."139 Therefore, a 
professional who acts according to the practice accepted by a responsible 
body of persons experienced and skilled in that particular profession may 
not be held negligent. This is commonly referred to as the "Bolam 
principle".140 Furthermore, where there are almost equally compelling 
professional opinions or where the opinions are divided, the professional 
will not be held liable.141 
                                            
131  Deakin and Adams Markesinis and Deakin's Tort Law 185.  
132  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 145, 146.  
133  Deakin and Adams Markesinis and Deakin's Tort Law 189-190. 
134  Glasgow Corporation v Muir 1943 AC 488. 
135  Deakin and Adams Markesinis and Deakin's Tort Law 190. 
136  Witting Street on Torts 137-139. 
137  Bolam v Friem Hospital 1957 1 WLR 582 586. 
138  See Maynard v West Midlands RHA 1984 1 WLR 634; Sidaway v Bethlem Royal 
Hospital 1985 AC 871. 
139  Bolam v Friem Hospital 1957 1 WLR 582 587. 
140  See Deakin and Adams Markesinis and Deakin's Tort Law 189-190; Peel and 
Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 157. 
141  Deakin and Adams Markesinis and Deakin's Tort Law 190; Peel and Goudkamp 
Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 157. In Medi-Clinic Ltd v Vermeulen 2015 1 SA 241 
(SCA) 243-245, the South African Supreme Court of Appeal when faced with two 
conflicting medical opinions referred with approval to the Bolam principle as well as 
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In respect of defendants with exceptional skills, the subjective level of skill 
of the defendant is not taken into account and all that is required is the 
standard expected of the reasonably skilled person.142 If a defendant 
professes to have a particular acquired skill or experience, however, he or 
she will be held to a reasonable degree to such skill or expertise.143 
The standard of the reasonable person may be adjusted depending on the 
circumstances and risks involved. For example, in Wells v Cooper144 the 
defendant had negligently fitted a door handle himself. The plaintiff was 
injured when the door handle came loose from the door. The Court of 
Appeal was faced with the question of which standard of care should be 
applied in such an instance. The court held that the standard should not be 
that of the reasonable competent carpenter but that of the reasonably skilled 
amateur carpenter.145 In Philips v William Whitely Ltd146 a jeweler pierced 
the plaintiff's ears and it appeared that he took steps to disinfect the pierced 
ears but an abscess subsequently developed which could have been 
avoided had it been done by a medical practitioner. The court held that the 
jeweler took reasonable steps to avoid infection and needed to show only 
the skill required of a jeweler and not that of a surgeon.147 If a defendant is 
lacking in experience or skill in comparison to the reasonable person, the 
defendant may still be held liable in spite of his or her incompetence.148 The 
authority for this approach stems from the well-known case, Nettleship v 
Weston.149 In this case the Court of Appeal held that a learner driver who 
collided with a lamppost causing injury to her instructor was liable based on 
the (base) standard of the reasonable driver.150 Although it may be argued 
that the conduct of the learner driver was something that could have been 
                                            
the two English decisions of Bolitho v City Hackney Health Authority 1998 AC 232 
243-244 and Roe v Minister of Health 1954 2 QB 66 252. The court concluded that 
the hospital was not negligent in failing to ensure that a patient did not develop bed 
sores in the circumstance which led to his eventually being paralysed and confined 
to a wheelchair.  
142  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 144; Jones "Negligence" 556. 
143  Woolridge v Sumner 1963 2 QB 43; Witting Street on Torts 137-138. 
144  Wells v Cooper 1958 2 QB 265. 
145  Deakin and Adams Markesinis and Deakin's Tort Law 185. 
146  Philips v William Whitely Ltd 1938 1 All ER 566. 
147  Witting Street on Torts 132. 
148  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 143. 
149  Nettleship v Weston 1971 2 QB 691. In Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority 1987 
QB 730, the fact that the defendant was lacking experience in that he was a junior 
doctor was not taken into account. See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz 
on Tort 146-147; Jones "Negligence" 554; Deakin and Adams Markesinis and 
Deakin's Tort Law 188-189; Witting Street on Torts 135.  
150  See Cook v Cook 1986 68 ALR 353, where the High Court of Australia took into 
account the inexperience of the learner driver. However, the same approach was not 
followed in McNeilly v Imbree 2008 HCA 40. 
R AHMED  PER / PELJ 2021 (24)  18 
expected, the court was influenced inter alia by the fact that she had 
previously been convicted of driving without due care, and had insurance.151 
In respect of a child defendant, the test is varied to that of the reasonable 
child of the same age.152 It has not been settled in English tort law whether 
the child's subjective maturity, mental ability or experience should be 
considered.153 However, in exceptional circumstances where a child 
partakes in activities normally undertaken by an adult, the reasonable 
person test will apply.154 In general, a very young child, for example, under 
the age of three years old cannot be held liable.155 
Moran156 refers to a number of examples to illustrate under what 
circumstances child defendants are held liable in terms of Common Law. 
For example, in McHale v Watson157 a twelve-year-old boy threw a metal 
rod which struck a nine-year-old girl's right eye, rendering her blind in that 
eye. The standard applied was that of an ordinary child of a similar age.158 
Moran159 explains how content was given to the standard; that is, whether 
the young boy had behaved reasonably in the circumstances. In respect of 
foreseeability, it was held that the child did not have knowledge or 
appreciation of the risk of throwing the rod.160 He did not reasonably foresee 
that when the rod was thrown it would taper off and strike the girl.161 The 
boy's age limited his ability to foresee harm and also his ability to act 
prudently.162 He was found not culpable because his "capacity for foresight 
or prudence" was "characteristic of humanity at his stage of development 
and in that sense normal."163 Moran highlights that the court found the boy's 
conduct normal, natural, and not an idiosyncrasy.164 Kitko J165 concluded, 
                                            
151  Nettleship v Weston 1971 2 QB 691 699. See Deakin and Adams Markesinis and 
Deakin's Tort Law 189. 
152  See Mullin v Richards 1998 1 WLR 1304 1308-1309, where the standard applied 
was that of "an ordinarily prudent and reasonable fifteen-year old schoolgirl in the 
defendant's situation"; Blake v Galloway 2004 1 WLR 284; Orchard v Lee 2009 PIQR 
P16; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 146; Jones "Negligence" 
562-563; Deakin and Adams Markesinis and Deakin's Tort Law 187-188. 
153  Witting Street on Torts 135. 
154  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 148. 
155  Witting Street on Torts 135. 
156  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 60-83. 
157  McHale v Watson 1966 115 CLR 199 (Aust HC).  
158  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 63, 215.  
159  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 64. 
160  McHale v Watson 1966 115 CLR 199 (Aust HC) 214-215. 
161  McHale v Watson 1966 115 CLR 199 (Aust HC) 215-216. 
162  McHale v Watson 1966 115 CLR 199 (Aust HC) 215. 
163  McHale v Watson 1966 115 CLR 199 (Aust HC) 213. 
164  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 77. 
165  McHale v Watson 1966 115 CLR 199 (Aust HC) 216. 
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"that boys of twelve may behave as boys of twelve and that, sometimes, is 
a risk indeed." Moran166 submits that the majority of judges had empathy for 
the boy. They referred to the nostalgia of their childhood and they could not 
find liability for "boyish imprudence". Moran explains that after surveying 
cases167 involving children, almost "all of the child defendants are boys".168 
Moran169 refers to Michaud v Dupuis,170 where the court found negligent an 
eleven-year-old boy who threw a stone at a four-year-old girl rendering her 
blind in an eye. The court171 found his conduct "reckless … with complete 
disregard for the safety of other people." Moran172 points out that there was 
no mutual play, there was a larger age difference between them and the 
boy's conduct was close to the intentional infliction of harm. In Pollock v 
Lipkowitz173 a thirteen-year-old boy was found liable for his "senseless act 
of folly"174 when he threw nitric acid at an eleven-year-old girl. Thus the latter 
two cases illustrate abnormal behaviour.175 In Mullin v Richards,176 where 
two fifteen-year-old schoolgirls were playing sword-fighting with rulers, the 
ruler snapped and a fragment of the plastic struck Mullin's eye, rendering 
her blind in that eye. The appeal court held that both the girls' conduct was 
not excessively or inappropriately violent. Their conduct was commonplace 
in school and neither of them had foreseen the risk of harm.177 Butler-Sloss 
LJ concluded that "girls of 15 playing together may play as somewhat 
irresponsible girls of 15."178 Moran179 submits that the objective standard of 
reasonableness relates to the ordinariness, normalcy or commonness of 
sword-fighting and the lack of foreseeability of harm. 
Moran180 interestingly refers to the application of the doctrine of allurement. 
According to this doctrine, children are often naturally tempted and attracted 
to play with dangerous things but are unaware of the reality of the danger. 
                                            
166  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 79-82. 
167  At the time of writing the book. 
168  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 86. 
169  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 86. 
170  Michaud v Dupuis 1977 20 NBR 2d 305 (QB). 
171  Michaud v Dupuis 1977 20 NBR 2d 305 (QB) 308. 
172  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 86. 
173  Pollock v Lipkowitz 1970 17 DLR 3d 766 (Man QB). See Moran Rethinking the 
Reasonable Person 86. 
174  Pollock v Lipkowitz 1970 17 DLR 3d 766 (Man QB) 768. 
175  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 86-87. 
176  Mullin v Richards 1998 1 All ER 920 (CA). See Moran Rethinking the Reasonable 
Person 88-89. 
177  Mullin v Richards 1998 1 All ER 920 (CA) 927. 
178  Mullin v Richards 1998 1 All ER 920 (CA) 928.Also see Blake v Galloway 2004 1 
WLR 284, where the court found that horseplay between two fifteen-year old children 
did not amount to negligence. 
179  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 89-90, 94, 129, 131. 
180  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 97-98, 114. 
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They are generally not held liable because this behaviour is considered 
natural.181 
In situations where a person suffers some kind of physical disability182 such 
as a heart attack,183 loss of consciousness as a result of hypoglycaemia184 
or a sudden blackout not caused by his or her own fault, the person will not 
be held liable. In English law it is acknowledged that the reasonable person 
may suffer a disabling condition which suddenly manifests itself and of 
which he or she is not aware (or should not reasonably have been 
reasonably aware of). Under the circumstances, the reasonable person with 
the sudden disabling condition may have acted as the defendant did.185 
English law does not differentiate between conduct and fault as in South 
African law, where both conduct and fault under such circumstances would 
be absent. If the defendant through fault on his part forgets to take his 
medication, thereby leading to a blackout, the principle of "prior fault" 
applies and the defendant may be held liable.186 
A mentally impaired person can generally be held liable and the standard of 
the reasonable person will be applied unless the person "cannot understand 
the nature and consequence of his act."187 The decision would depend on 
                                            
181  Moran Rethinking the Reasonable Person 104, 107, 126-128 refers to Gough v 
National Coal Board 1953 2 All ER 1283 (CA) 1293, where it was stated the boy was 
"extremely likely to succumb to the temptation" and boys have been behaving in 
such a manner since "time immemorial"; Cooke v Midland Great Western Railway of 
Ireland 1909 AC 229 (HL) 237, where unguarded vehicles and machines were 
considered "calculated to attract or allure"; Lengyel v Manitoba Power Commission 
1957 12 DLR 2d 126 (Man CA) 133, where the court held that the device was 
"calculated to attract small boys, to arouse their curiosity"; Coley v CPR 1906 29 
(Que SC) 285, where it was held that a turntable was an allurement to children. In 
this case a nine-year-old girl was playing on a turntable and was seriously injured 
resulting in the amputation of her foot. See further cases referred to by Moran 
Rethinking the Reasonable Person 104-107. 
182  Or has a condition. 
183  See Roberts v Ramsbottom 1980 1 WLR 823, where the defendant who was 
unaware that he had suffered a stroke resulting in an accident but admitted to feeling 
dizzy before driving, was found negligent. The court held that the plaintiff continued 
to drive when he should have been aware that he was unfit and would have escaped 
liability only if his actions had been entirely beyond his control. Witting Street on 
Torts 135-136. 
184  In Mansfield v Weetabix 1998 1 WLR 1263 1268 Leggat LJ held that the standard of 
care applicable to the driver who suffered from hypoglycaemia of which he was 
unaware was judged according to "that which is to be expected of a reasonably 
competent driver unaware that he is or may be suffering" from such a condition. The 
Appeal Court found the driver not liable. See Jones "Negligence" 561; Witting Street 
on Torts 136. 
185  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 148. See Ahmed 2019 PELJ 13. 
186  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 149. 
187  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 778 with reference to Hanbury v 
Hanbury 1892 8 TLR 559 569. 
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whether the defendant had the "requisite state of mind for liability in the 
particular tort with which he is charged."188 For example, in Morris v 
Marsden189 the mentally impaired defendant attacked the manager of the 
hotel he was staying at. It transpired that the defendant was aware of the 
nature and extent of his conduct but not aware that what he was doing was 
indeed wrong. It was held that because he was aware of the nature and 
extent of his conduct, he was liable for the intentional tort of battery. His 
obliviousness of the fact that what he was doing was wrong was considered 
immaterial.190 Stable J191 held that if a person acts without intention and 
"carelessness", causing grievous injury, thus being without fault and in a 
complete state of automatism, then he cannot be held liable.192 
3.3  The United States of America (American law) 
3.3.1  Tort of negligence 
Once it has been established that a duty of reasonable care is owed, the 
conduct of the parties is tested against the standard of a reasonable person 
under the circumstances.193 Sometimes the standard must be adjusted, for 
example to that of the reasonable professional, and the adjudicator 
determines the standard that should be applied in the particular 
circumstances of the case.194 The standard of the reasonable person is 
predominantly objective in that it applies generally to cases testing the 
parties' conduct against the hypothetical, model reasonable person. It is an 
external standard based on "what society demands generally of its 
members rather than upon the actor's personal morality or individual sense 
                                            
188  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 778. 
189  Morris v Marsden 1952 1 All ER 925. 
190  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 778; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 
Law 699. 
191  Morris v Marsden 1952 1 All ER 925, 927. 
192  See Ahmed 2019 PELJ 11. 
193  See Lugtu v Cal Highway Patrol 26 Cal 4th 703, 110 Cal Rptr 2d 528, 28 P 3d 249 
(2011); Gossett v Jackson 249 Va 549, 457 SE 2d 97 (1995); American Law Institute 
Restatement Second of Torts 1965 § 282-283 (1965); American Law Institute 
Restatement Third of Torts 2010 §§ 7, 16(2); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on Torts 214. Different volumes of the Restatement of Torts will be referred to in this 
contribution as they are influential in American law. These volumes consist of black 
letter law applied throughout the different states in the United States of America as 
well as case law restating current existing common law, see Zweigert and Kötz 
Introduction to Comparative Law 252. See Ahmed 2019 PELJ fn 102. 
194  American Law Institute Restatement Third of Torts 2010 § 10(1). 
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of right and wrong."195 The reasonable person has reasonable prudence196 
as well as common knowledge,197 is cautious,198 and possesses normal 
perception and memory.199 The subjective part of the reasonable person 
standard relates to "additional intelligence, skill, or knowledge actually 
possessed by the individual"200 coupled with his "physical attributes", 
although they are still tested objectively.201 
The Restatement Third of Torts202 refers to superior skills or knowledge as 
circumstances to be taken into account in determining whether the actor 
acted reasonably. For example, a race car driver who has superior driving 
abilities would be more skilled at avoiding an accident in an emergency than 
an ordinary driver. The race car driver may be held negligent for failing to 
use his superior skill in avoiding an accident.203 
Professionals are expected to exercise reasonable care and to possess a 
minimum standard of knowledge and ability. If the professional professes 
further specialised knowledge or skills, the standard is adjusted to the 
specialised skill and knowledge held to the accepted practice, customary 
                                            
195  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 169. See McNeely v M & M 
Supermarkets Inc 1980 154 Ga App 675, 269 SE 2d 483; Stewart v Jefferson 
Plywood Co 1970 255 Or 603, 469 P 2d 783. 
196  See Trentacoast v Brussel 1980 82 NJ 214, 412 A 2d 436; Swenson Trucking & 
Excavating Inc v Truckweld Equipment Co Alaska 1980 604 P 2d 1113; Keeton et al 
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 174 (referring to the reasonable prudent 
person). 
197  Compared with common knowledge in the community at the time of the tort. 
198  See Massey v Scripter 1977 401 Mich 385, 258 NW 2d 44; St Mary's Hosp Inc v 
Bynum, Ark 1978 573 SW 2d 914; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on the Law of 
Torts 174 (referring to the reasonably careful person). 
199  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 222, 229. See Restatement Second 
of Torts 1965 289-290, which states that an ordinary person has knowledge that 
matches will burn, alcohol induces intoxication, gravity makes weight fall from a high 
place, and a person can get electrocuted when coming into contact with a power 
line. American Law Institute Restatement Third of Torts 2010 § 12. For example, a 
reasonable person is not expected to know that fumes from gasoline are heavier 
than air (see Blakes v Blakes 517 So 2d 444 (La Ct App 1987)). Also see the 
discussion by Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 182-185 with 
regard to the difficulty with the question of how much knowledge the defendant is 
required to possess. 
200  See American Law Institute Restatement Second of Torts 1965 §§ 289, 290 cmt f, 
299 cmt f.  
201  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 222. 
202  American Law Institute Restatement Third of Torts 2010 § 12. See Sinai v Polinger 
Co 498 A 2d 520 (DC 1985); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 230-
231. See fn. 195 above regarding the different volumes of the Restatement of Torts 
referred to in this contribution. 
203  See American Law Institute Restatement Third of Torts 2010 § 12; Green and Cardi 
"Basic Questions of Tort Law" 484. 
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and usual standard of the relevant professional, such as a doctor, dentist, 
accountant etcetera.204 
A person with a disability is judged according to the standard of the 
reasonable person with such a disability.205 The Restatement Third of 
Torts206 with reference to conduct of persons with physical disability states 
that the standard of negligence is that of a "reasonably careful person with 
the same disability". This standard is usually applied to persons who are 
blind or deaf or where there is a loss of a motor function.207 If a person is 
below average in "judgment, knowledge, or skills" such as a learner driver, 
he or she is still judged according to the (base) standard of the reasonable 
person.208 
A person who is "reasonably unaware" of his or her physical limitation, 
impairment or disability, as when a person unaware of her heart condition 
suffers a heart attack, may not be held liable, as the heart attack was not 
foreseeable.209 Even though conduct is present, negligence is absent.210 
The same principles will apply with other types of conditions, as when a 
person sustains an epileptic fit, sustains a stroke, or faints.211 In instances 
where a person is aware of their physical impairment, pre-existing condition 
or disability or can reasonably foresee that they are prone to such a 
condition, impairment or disability, the person may be held negligent for not 
controlling the condition.212 
                                            
204  See the discussion by Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 185-193 
as well as the authority referred to. 
205  See Fink v City of New York 206 Misc 79, 132 NYS 2d 172 (Sup Ct 1954); American 
Law Institute Restatement Second of Torts 1965 § 283C; Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on Torts 223; cases referred to Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton 
on the Law of Torts 176 fn. 23 in respect of people with disabilities, who are blind 
and deaf. 
206  American Law Institute Restatement Third of Torts 2010 § 11(a). 
207  Epstein and Sharkey Cases and Materials on Torts 158. 
208  American Law Institute Restatement Third of Torts 2010 § 10 cmt b; Epstein and 
Sharkey Cases and Materials on Torts 147-148. 
209  See Ahmed 2019 PELJ 20-21. 
210  See Baker v Joyal 4 AD 3d 596, 771 NYS 2d 269 (2004); Hancock-Underwood v 
Knight 670 SE 2d 720 (Va 2009); American Law Institute Restatement Third of Torts 
2010 § 11(b); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 224; Ahmed 2019 
PELJ fn. 147. 
211  See Ahmed 2019 PELJ 2019 20-21, fn. 148; Moore v Preenell 1977 38 Md App 243, 
379 A 2d 1246 as well as Frechette v Welch (1st Cir 1980) 621 F 2d 11; Keeton et 
al Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 162.  
212  See Ahmed 2019 PELJ fn. 149; Goodrich v Blair 132 Ariz 459, 646 P 2d 890 (1982); 
Lutzkovitz v Murray 339 A 2d 64, 93 ALR 3d 321 (Del 1975); Howle v PYA/Monarch 
Inc 288 SC 586, 344 SE 2d 157 (1986); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
Torts 225 fn157-159. 
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Generally, children under the age of five are deemed incapable of being 
negligent.213 In a few states, children under seven years of age may not be 
held liable in tort and children from seven to fourteen years of age are 
presumed incapable of negligence which may be rebutted.214 The conduct 
of a minor is not judged according to the standard of the reasonable person 
or the reasonable child of the same age but with the care of a reasonable 
person "of his age, intelligence, and experience in similar circumstances", 
(a more subjective standard).215 Liability in tort will depend on whether in 
the light of the child's age, experience and intelligence he or she acted 
reasonably.216 The age of the child, maturity, knowledge, prior experience, 
whether he or she can understand the consequences of his or her actions 
(accountability), as well as other surrounding circumstances are taken into 
account.217 A child with a mental impairment or incapacity is not expected 
to act with the care of a child without such an impairment or incapacity.218 
Similarly, a child with the experience and intelligence equivalent to that of 
an adult will be expected to act like a reasonable person.219 A child's 
conduct may be judged according to the standard of the reasonable person 
when a child undertakes a dangerous activity usually undertaken by 
adults.220 For example, the courts have applied the reasonable person test 
                                            
213  See Mastland Inc v Evans Furniture Inc 498 NW 2d 682 (Iowa 1993); Price v Kitsap 
Transit 125 Wash 2d 456, 886 P 2d 556 (1994); American Law Institute Restatement 
Third of Torts 2010 § 10(b); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 233; 
Epstein and Sharkey Cases and Materials on Torts 150.  
214  Georgia has by a statute exempted children under thirteen years of age from liability 
in tort. See Horton v Hinley 261 Ga 863, 413 SE 2d 199 (1992); Savage Indus v 
Duke 598 So 2d 856 (Ala 1992); Queen Ins v Hammond 374 Mich 655, 132 NW 2d 
792 (1965); Steele v Holiday Inns Inc 626 So 2d 593 (Miss 1993); Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 233; authority referred to by Keeton et al Prosser 
and Keeton on the Law of Torts 179 fn. 58. 
215  See First Nat'l Bank of Ariz v Dupree 136 Ariz 296, 665 P 2d 1018 (Ct App 1983); 
Lehmuth v Long Beach Unified Sch Dist 53 Cal 2d 544, 348 P 2d 887, 2 Cal Rptr 
279 (1960); American Law Institute Restatement Second of Torts 1965 § 283A; 
Restatement Third of Torts 2010 §§ 8(2), 10(a); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on Torts 233 fn. 224; cases referred to by Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton 
on the Law of Torts 179 fn. 47. 
216  See cases cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 233 fn 227-280. 
217  See Hudson v Old Guard Ins 3 A 3d 246 (Del 2010); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on Torts 233 fn 236.  
218  See Lafayette Par Sch Bd v Cormier ex rel Cormier 901 So 2d 1197 (La Ct App 
2005); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 234.  
219  Dorais v Paquin 113 NH 187, 304 A 2d 369 (1973); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on Torts 234.  
220  See American Law Institute Restatement Second of Torts 1965 § 283(A); American 
Law Institute Restatement Third of Torts 2010 § 10(c); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on Torts 236; Epstein and Sharkey Cases and Materials on Torts 150-
151. 
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to children operating a motorised vehicle,221 tractor,222 boat,223 and a 
snowmobile.224 The reasonable person standard, however, does not apply 
to minors who were involved in hunting accidents where guns were 
involved225 or where minors ride bicycles.226 
If an elderly driver is not able to respond to accidents as a result of a decline 
in his or her mental or physical abilities then he or she should not be driving 
as he or she poses a risk to others.227 The Restatement Third of Torts228 
provides a rule that a child under the age of five cannot be held to be 
contributorily negligent. This rule has also been applied to an 
institutionalised elderly person.229 
A mental impairment, incapacity or disability will generally not exonerate a 
person from liability in tort.230 American law developed in this way and an 
insane person or a person with a mental impairment will still be judged 
according to the reasonable person standard.231 Even though this has been 
widely criticised, the standard of care applied to a mentally impaired person 
                                            
221  See Adams v Lopez 407 P 2d 50 (NM 1965) in respect of a motorised scooter; 
Pritchard v Veterans Cab Co 63 Cal 2d 727, 408 P 2d 360, 47 Cal Rptr 904 (1965); 
other cases referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 236 fn 
251; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 179. 
222  See Jackson v McCuiston 448 SW 2d 33 (Ark 1969); Goodfellow v Coggburn 98 
Idaho 202, 203-204, 560 P 2d 873 (1977). 
223  Dellwo v Pearson 259 Minn 452, 107 NW 2d 859, 97 ALR 2d 866 (1961). 
224  See Robinson v Lindsay 92 Wash 2d 410, 598 P 2d 392 (1979); Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on Torts 236; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 
179. 
225  See Purtle v Shelton 474 SW 2d 123 (Ark 1971), where the reasonable person 
standard was not applied, the minors age (a seventeen-year-old child) was 
considered. 
226  American Law Institute Restatement Third of Torts 2005 § 8 cmt f; Epstein and 
Sharkey Cases and Materials on Torts 119. 
227  Roberts v Ring 173 NW 437, 438 (Minn 1919); American Law Institute Restatement 
Third of Torts 2005 § 9 cmt c; Epstein and Sharkey Cases and Materials on Torts 
151. 
228  American Law Institute Restatement Third of Torts 2000 § 10 cmt e. See Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 392. 
229  See Fields v Senior Citizens Ctr Inc 528 So 2d 573, 581 (La Ct App 1988); Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 392. 
230  See McGuire v Almy 8 NE 2d 760 (Mass 1936); Polmatier v Russ 537 A 2d 468 
(Conn 1988); Williams v Kearby 775 P 2d 670 (Kan App 1989); American Law 
Institute Restatement Second of Torts 1979 § 895J; American Law Institute 
Restatement Third of Torts 2010 § 11(c). 
231  See Ahmed 2019 PELJ 21; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 
177 fn. 32 and the cases cited therein; Epstein and Sharkey Cases and Materials on 
Torts 156. 
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or insane person remains that of the reasonable person and not that of the 
reasonable person affected with a mental impairment.232 
Certain statutes may in a sense lower the standard of reasonable care. For 
example, motor vehicles responding to an emergency such as police motor 
vehicles, fire engines and ambulances etcetera may according to certain 
legislation disobey usual traffic rules but must still either drive with 
reasonable care233 or not recklessly in the circumstances.234 
3.4  France (French law) 
3.4.1  Articles 1382 to 1383 of the French Civil Code of 1804 (hereinafter 
referred to as the "CC")235 relating to liability for one's own personal 
conduct where fault is required 
The terms "imputability", "discernment" (discernement), or "culpability" in 
French law are used interchangeably and are somewhat similar to the 
concept "capacity" in Anglo-American law and "accountability" in South 
African law. "Imputability" refers to an element of blameworthiness and 
whether the defendant was aware that his or her conduct was wrongful or 
could lead to harmful consequences.236 In French law the requirement of 
"imputability" for delictual liability has been dispensed with. This has 
affected mainly minors and mentally impaired persons.237 
Previously mentally impaired persons could not be held liable on the ground 
that the person lacked "imputability". This changed, however, with the 
                                            
232  See Ahmed 2019 PELJ 21-22. 
233  See Torres v City of Los Angeles 58 Cal 2d 35, 372 P 2d 906, 22 Cal Rptr 866 
(1962); Frazier v Common Wealth 845 A 2d 253, 260 (Pa Commw Ct 2004); Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 221 fn. 134.  
234  See Robins v City of Wichita 285 Kan 455, 172 P 3d 1187 (2007); Lenard v Dilley 
805 So 2d 175 (La 2002); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 221 fn 
135. 
235  The French law of delict is regulated by the French Civil Code of 1804 (the "CC"), in 
particular Arts 1382-1386. 
236  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort Law 332, 354. 
237  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort Law 332-333. 
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decision in Buguel v Morin.238 Following this decision, Article 489-2239 was 
subsequently incorporated in the CC (now Article 414-3),240 which states 
that "[h]e who has caused harm to another while under the control of a 
mental disturbance is nevertheless obligated to provide reparation."241 The 
intention behind the insertion of this new article was to remove (subjective) 
"imputability" as a requirement for liability. Mental disturbance is defined in 
a strict sense for the purposes of this Article and it does not cover brief 
intervals of lapse of consciousness.242 After the implementation of Article 
489-2, the Cour de Cassation243 in 1976 held that the article applied to all 
persons with mental impairments whether they were minors or majors. The 
principles applied in Buguel v Morin are still valid in that they apply in 
instances where the parent or person responsible for the minor cannot be 
held liable and where a person who is ill has a duty to take care of himself 
or herself, which includes taking necessary precautions with regard to his 
or her condition.244 
Prior to 1968, children could only be held delictually liable when they had 
reached the "âge de raison" (age of reason or discernment), typically from 
seven years onwards. The courts245 had to establish in each case whether 
the child had reached the age of discernment. The "reasonable child" test 
                                            
238  Cass civ 2 15 December 1965, D 1966 Jur 397 where a mentally impaired person 
had just been released form a psychiatric institution. He had not fully recovered but 
was in a state of "sufficient awareness and free will". It was expected of him to take 
care of himself but instead he drank heavily for two days. While in the intoxicated 
state he shot and seriously injured the plaintiff. Criminal proceedings could not be 
instituted against him due to the mental state he was in when he shot the plaintiff. 
However, the Cour de Cassation (the highest civil court in France) confirmed that he 
had committed a faute and that his "mental deficiency which continued to exist, did 
not deprive him of all awareness and free will." He was held delictually liable. See 
the discussion of this case in Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort Law 313-314. 
239  Law no 68-5 of 3 January 1968 inserted Art 489-2. 
240  Now Art 414-3 by Law no 2007-308 of 5 March 2007. 
241  Légifrance-translations. See Moréteau "Basic Questions of Tort Law" 65. 
242  Where for example a person suffers a heart attack and falls unconscious (Cass civ 
2 4 February 1981 79-11243, Bull civ 1981 II 21, JCP 1981 IV 136). See Van Dam 
European Tort Law 272; Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort Law 334. 
243  Cass civ 1 20 July 1976 74-10238, Bull civ 1976 I 270 218. See the discussion of 
this case in Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort Law 336. The Cour de Cassation 
is the highest civil court in France, see fn 240 above.  
244  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort Law 314. 
245  See Cass civ 2 8 February 1962, Bull civ 1962 II 180, where it was held that an eight-
year-old child did not understand that the fire would spread to other buildings and 
could therefore not be held liable; CA Paris 6 June 1959, D 1959 76, where a six-
year-old child was held liable for running a bicycle against a person who was sitting 
on a bench; TGI St Etienne 15 May 1974, Gaz Pal 1976 109, where it was held that 
a fourteen-year-old child was old enough to appreciate the consequences of using 
an air rifle (Ferreira Fundamental Rights and Private Law in Europe 142-143). Also 
see Van Dam European Tort Law 272. 
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was applied to children, and age was considered as a subjective factor. A 
similar approach was applied in assessing the conduct of an elderly person, 
usually over seventy years of age.246 In 1984 a number of decisions247 
dealing with minors were considered culminating in the landmark decision 
of SAMDA v Molina,248 where the Cour de Cassation held that it was not 
necessary to prove that the minor was able to "appreciate the 
consequences of his actions" or that he had sufficient discernment to 
appreciate the consequences of his actions. The Cour de Cassation showed 
a clear shift in determining faute in an objective manner, dispensing with the 
requirement of "imputability" in the French law of delict. This shift was aimed 
at benefitting the plaintiff and protecting his or her rights.249 Discernment, 
however, remains a requirement in criminal law in terms of the French Penal 
Code (Code Pénal).250 
Currently, a minor in French law is a child under the age of eighteen years, 
and in order for a minor to be at fault, it must be shown that he or she did 
not act like a "bonus pater familias".251 This standard is equivalent to the 
standard of the reasonable person applied in South African and Anglo-
American law in determining negligence. Faute, a concept which 
encompasses fault as known in South African and Anglo-American law, is 
now a "social concept" and not a moral concept,252 in that it does not refer 
to morals or culpability and is applied objectively to all persons whether they 
are minors or have mental impairments and so on.253 In French law, parents 
and other persons who are responsible for minors may be held strictly liable 
for the conduct of the minors in terms of Article 1384 of the CC. This will be 
discussed in more detail below.254 
                                            
246  See Galand-Carval "Liability for Damage Caused by Others" 92; Van Dam European 
Tort Law 270; Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort Law 336. 
247  See Cass Ass plén 9 May 1984 80-93481, Bull crim 1984 164, JCP 1984 II 20255 
note Dejean de La Bathie, D 1984 525 note Chabas RTDciv 1984 509 observations 
Huet; Moréteau "Basic Questions of Tort Law" 65; Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche 
Tort Law 336. 
248  Cass civ 2 12 December 1984 82-12627, Bull civ 1984 II 193. In this case, a seven-
year-old schoolboy violently pushed his classmate. The classmate subsequently 
struck a bench and sustained a burst spleen which caused a haemorrhage. See the 
discussion of this case in Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort Law 335-337. 
249  Galand-Carval "Liability for Damage Caused by Others" 90. 
250  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort Law 302. 
251  "Good family father". Galand-Carval "Liability for Damage Caused by Others" 92; 
Van Dam European Tort Law 270; Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort Law 336. 
252  As it does not refer to morals or culpability. 
253  See Van Dam European Tort Law 58; Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort Law 
280. 
254 See para 3.4.2 below. 
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French law assesses the defendant's conduct in abstracto as compared to 
in concreto. That is, is does not consider internal circumstances (subjective 
factors including inter alia the age or cultural and social characteristics of a 
person, or the physical, psychological, or other inherent infirmities of a 
person) but considering external circumstances (the nature of the conduct 
as well as the time and place where the delict occurred). Certain so-called 
inferior internal circumstances, such as physical disabilities, or so-called 
superior factors, such as professional experience or skill, are considered 
when assessing the degree of caution or diligence required.255 
Statutory provisions may adjust the standard of the "bonus pater familias". 
For example, in respect of road accidents where the loi Badinter is 
applicable,256 contributory negligence on the part of a child under sixteen 
years of age, a person older than seventy years, and a person more than 
eighty per cent incapacitated can no longer apply as a defence in limiting 
liability. However, drivers may still be held contributorily negligent.257 
The standard is adjusted and raised when it comes to professionals like 
medical practitioners. Sound examples of how the adjusted standard of 
reasonable conduct is assessed are found in cases dealing with medical 
practitioners. In private hospitals, medical practitioners including staff at 
clinics, may generally be held contractually liable. The patient must still 
prove faute, causation and damage as with delictual liability. The medical 
practitioner is the debtor in terms of the contractual obligations who must 
treat the patient with all possible means.258 In respect of a contractual 
obligation, obligation de moyens, the defences that may be raised are 
contributory fault on the part of the plaintiff or some extraneous cause which 
cannot be attributed to the conduct of the defendant.259 In some instances, 
an obligation may be to do the best one can do under the circumstances. 
For example, a medical practitioner has an obligation to use his or her best 
efforts to cure a patient.260 
Generally, medical practitioners and other staff such as midwives will not be 
held liable for negligent conduct or have faute if they were acting like 
reasonable professionals in the course and scope of their functions. 
Currently, employees may be held liable only if they "wilfully commit a 
                                            
255  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort Law 353. 
256  Law no 85-677 of 5 July 1985, hereinafter referred to as "loi Badinter". This act has 
regulated traffic accidents in France since 5 July 1985. 
257  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort Law 314. 
258  See Cass civ 1 20 May 1936 (Mercier), DP I 88; Brun 2002 Eur Tort Law Yearb 180. 
259  See Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort Law 285. 
260  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort Law 285-286. 
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criminal offence" or "act outside the scope of their functions".261 For 
example, in a case262 where a patient's intestine was perforated during a 
colonoscopy, the patient sued the medical practitioner for damages. The 
medical practitioner argued that the risk was inherent in the technique and 
that there was no faute on his part. The Cour de Cassation confirmed the 
decision of the lower court in finding that the perforation resulted from the 
inept conduct of the medical practitioner in that his conduct strayed from 
that of the reasonable medical practitioner and was therefore unreasonable. 
The purpose of the colonoscopy was to examine the intestinal walls, and 
harm to the intestinal wall was not included. The damages claimed were 
awarded to the patient. Generally, if there is a risk inherent in the medical 
procedure, then it is likely that there is no faute on the part of the medical 
practitioner. In another case263 a medical practitioner was not held liable 
when he performed an operation on the carpal tunnel of the plaintiff's left 
hand. During the operation he severed the median nerve of the plaintiff's 
hand. The operation was performed under endoscopy using specific 
instruments and the procedure itself carries risks because every individual's 
hand is anatomically different. The Cour de Cassation found that the 
medical practitioner's conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. 
The medical practitioner had taken the necessary precautions, had not been 
careless or negligent, had not committed an error, and there was no faute 
on his part. In another case,264 while operating on a patient's Achilles tendon 
a surgeon damaged the patient's tibial nerve, even though it was five 
centimetres away from the tendon. The appeal court held that such a lesion 
was a risk inherent in such a procedure. The Cour de Cassation agreed and 
liability was excluded. Moréteau265 points out that liability on the part of the 
medical practitioner may still be found even when the medical procedures 
carry inherent risks. 
Inexperience in French law does not seem to be considered as a mitigating 
factor or apply in lowering the base standard. For example, in Lignon v 
Avril266 an amateur volleyball player inadvertently fell down during a game 
and unintentionally kicked a fellow player, injuring him. The injured player 
then sued the amateur player. The Cour de Cassation found the amateur 
                                            
261  See Cass civ 1 9 November 2004 01-17908, Bull civ 2004 I 262 219; Moréteau 2007 
Eur Tort Law Yearb 276.  
262  Cass civ 1 18 September 2008 07-12170; Bull civ 2008 I 205. See the discussion 
of this case by Moréteau 2009 Eur Tort Law Yearb 206-208. 
263  Cass civ 1 29 November 2005 03-16308, Bull civ 2005 I 456 383. 
264  Cass civ 1 18 September 2008 07-13080, Bull civ 2008 I 206. 
265  Moréteau 2009 Eur Tort Law Yearb 207-208. 
266  Cass civ 2 3 July 1991 90-13158, Bull civ 1991 II 210 111. 
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player liable, even though the conduct was involuntary and not wrongful.267 
The Cour de Cassation found that the inexperienced player could not judge 
distances and should have warned the other player of his lack of an ability 
to judge distances. He was found to be negligent in not informing the injured 
player.268 In instances where an inexperienced or drunken driver or pilot 
raises voluntary assumption of risk as a defence, it is rare that it will apply 
in exonerating liability but may apply in limiting liability based on contributory 
fault on the part of the plaintiff.269 
3.4.2  Strict liability for the acts of a person for whom one is responsible in 
terms of Article 1384 of the CC 
The French concept of liability for the act of another is somewhat similar to 
vicarious liability in other jurisdictions, but in French law fault on the part of 
the person who committed the delict is not a requirement. Common to both 
concepts is a differentiation between personal liability and liability for the act 
of another.270 Even though this paragraph does not deal with the application 
of the standard of the reasonable person in French law, the point here is to 
give a holistic view of a person's liability for the conduct of a minor or person 
with a mental impairment. 
Stemming from Teffaine271 and thereafter the landmark decision referred to 
as "Blieck",272 the Cour de Cassation held that the general provision in 
Article 1384(1) permitted it to develop further heads of delictual liability. In 
Blieck a mentally impaired boy was placed in an institution.273 He was 
entrusted to do some unsupervised work outside the centre during the day. 
One day while working outside the centre, he set fire to the plaintiff's wood. 
The damages could not be recovered from the boy. The plaintiff claimed 
from the institution and the Cour de Cassation held that the institution could 
be held strictly liable in terms of Article 1384(1) as the institution had control 
and supervision of a permanent nature over the boy. Since this decision a 
number of institutions have been held liable for acts of persons over which 
                                            
267  See Ahmed 2019 PELJ 23-24. 
268  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort Law 339. 
269  See Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort Law 734. 
270  Galand-Carval "Liability for Damage Caused by Others" 85. 
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they had permanent or temporary control.274 The justification for the liability 
of the public institution is based on the premise that the public institution 
takes a "special risk" in establishing itself as such an institution and 
providing such a service, according to the "risk theory".275 The justification 
for the liability of the acts of the person for whom one is responsible is based 
on the risk theory. For example, institutions such as medical and 
rehabilitation institutions, social services, educational institutions and sports 
clubs take a "special risk" in running such institutions and providing such 
services. Sports clubs organise, control and direct their members' activities. 
Parents who have children living with them have power and control over 
their children while raising them. Parents and most institutions, therefore, 
have insurance for such potential liability. Therefore, Article 1384(1) allows 
a plaintiff to claim compensation from the person who cares for, supervises, 
or has control over the person who caused the damage.276 Article 1384(1) 
may be applied where one is supervising an adult of unsound mind. Liability 
may be found if the harmful conduct was committed when the defendant 
had the power to "organize, direct and control the wrongdoer's way of 
life".277 In a case,278 an adult who had a mental impairment and was living 
with his father attended a specialised institution during the day. On one 
particular day he set fire to a building while on his way home from the 
institution. The plaintiff sued the institution as well as the father who was his 
administrateur legal (legal guardian). The Cour de Cassation held that the 
claim against the institution failed because at the time of the delict he was 
not under the supervision of the institution. The claim against the father also 
failed because the child was not a minor. 
Article 1384 of the CC provides inter alia for the strict liability of parents for 
the acts of their children who are still living with them.279 In France parents 
take out insurance which covers damage caused by children for whom they 
are responsible when they take out home insurance or insurance over rental 
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property.280 In terms of Article 1384(4) the parents of a minor281 may be held 
liable jointly and severally282 for damage caused by their minor child if at the 
time they exercised "parental authority" over the child; that is, if the child still 
usually lives with them.283 If a child commits a delict while in another 
person's care, the parents will not escape liability. All that needs to be 
established is that the child is liable to the plaintiff. Fault on the part of the 
child is not a requirement.284 The parents may still be held liable if the child 
causes harm to another while at school or on a school outing.285 It is not 
necessary to establish that the child directly caused the harm or loss.286 
Liability is strict in that the parents cannot raise a defence that "they did not 
contribute to the child's harmful act by a lack of supervision or a defective 
education."287 Previously parents were generally not held liable for the 
conduct of older children if they could establish that there was no faute on 
their part; that is, if they could prove that there was no failure on their part 
in supervising the child or no failure on their part in respect of the manner in 
which the child was brought up.288 In most instances the parents were 
personally at fault but their liability still fell under "responsabilité du fait 
d'autrui" (liability for the act of another).289 But since 1977, stemming from 
Bertrand v Domingues,290 lack of supervision as a requirement was 
discarded.291 Fault-based liability was changed to so-called objective 
liability.292 Furthermore, stemming from this decision the only defence a 
parent can rely on is contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, or if 
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there was some external cause to the damage.293 Article 1384(4) only 
applies to the parents, not for example to grandparents,294 and there is still 
uncertainty as to whether it applies to guardians.295 
The strict liability rule holding the parents liable may apply in instances 
where: the child committed a faute and an unlawful or wrongful act is 
sufficient; an "acte objectivement illicite" where the child need not be aware 
of the unlawfulness of his conduct;296 if the damage occurred as a result of 
a "thing" and the child was the custodian of the thing;297 and where the child 
directly caused the damage suffered by the plaintiff.298 For example, in one 
case,299 a child injured another child during a rugby game. The child's 
parents were held liable for the direct causing of injury, even though the 
child had not committed a faute. Article 1384(7) of the CC, however, states 
that the parents may not be held liable if they could not have prevented the 
harmful act. This relates for example to instances such as force majeure300 
or where there is contributory fault on the part of the plaintiff.301302 
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4  Comparative conclusions 
Now that an idea has been conveyed of how the reasonable person 
standard is applied and adjusted depending on the subjective attributes of 
the actor in the above-mentioned jurisdictions, it is possible to compare the 
different applications and analyse how the standard is adjusted from the 
base standard of the reasonable person. 
It is apparent that the standard of the reasonable person is objective as well 
as subjective. It is objective in the sense that it is the uniform standard that 
is applied in all the jurisdictions mentioned above to test fault in the form of 
negligence in the general community. It therefore applies generally to cases, 
testing the parties' conduct against the hypothetical model reasonable 
person.303 As already mentioned,304 the subjective part of the reasonable 
person standard relates to the personal subjective attributes of the actor, 
such as inter alia his or her age, knowledge, intelligence, experience, skill, 
physical attributes, and mental capacity, but still tested objectively.305 
Depending on the jurisdiction the standard applicable may be the 
reasonable child, the reasonable person with a physical disability, the 
reasonable professional and so on, where the test is still objective but also 
subjective when taking into consideration the subjective attributes of the 
actor. 
In all the jurisdictions discussed, the base standard of the reasonable 
person is not lowered to take into account the particular person's 
idiosyncrasies.306 Furthermore, in all the jurisdictions discussed, where a 
person is an expert the base standard of the reasonable person is raised, 
depending on the person's profession, and a reasonable measure of the 
particular expertise is expected.307 In respect of the reasonable expert 
standard, besides the particular circumstances present at the time of the 
delict or tort having an effect, the expert is expected to possess the level of 
skill and diligence at the time of the delict or tort of other members of the 
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professional body to which he or she belongs.308 In terms of an expert, 
whether his or her conduct deviated from that of the reasonable expert will 
depend on whether the professional acted within the scope of his or her 
functions and whether he or she acted with the necessary care, skill, and 
diligence expected of the expert under the same circumstances.309 In 
making a careless error such as perforating an intestinal wall while 
undertaking a routine scope, a professional's conduct is considered 
unreasonable and may be found negligent.310 Where a person professes to 
have a particular acquired skill or experience, the person will be held to a 
reasonable degree of such skill or expertise.311 
In instances where there is a lack of experience, such as in the case of the 
learner driver, it seems that there is no leniency and the base standard of 
the reasonable person applies, especially where the lack of skill and 
experience poses a danger to others.312 The rationale for this is that the 
learner driver undertakes an activity that requires a certain level of skill or 
knowledge and he or she ought to know that he or she lacks the required 
skill or knowledge while undertaking the activity. If the learner driver causes 
harm to another as a result of his or her lack of skill or experience, then the 
learner driver may be found negligent.313 In South African law, however, it 
seems that where the lack of experience and skill does not pose any danger 
(as in the examples of the novice golfer or inexperienced young teacher) 
the base standard of the reasonable person may not be applied but rather 
lowered, as the inexperienced person may not be expected to display the 
same level of knowledge and skill as that of the experienced golfer or 
teacher.314 In American law, as already said,315 certain statutes may lower 
the standard of reasonable care of drivers who respond to an emergency, 
such as police motor vehicles, fire engines and ambulances etcetera. The 
drivers may disobey the usual traffic rules but must still either drive with 
reasonable care or not recklessly under the circumstances. In France, 
according to the loi Badinter,316 children under sixteen years of age, a 
person older than seventy years and a person more than eighty per cent 
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incapacitated may not be held contributorily negligent, but it seems that the 
base standard of the "bonus pater familias" applies to all drivers.317 
Children are generally held to a more relaxed standard when compared to 
adults, in that, to begin with, in some jurisdictions very young children 
cannot be held negligent.318 Generally, in English law a very young child 
such as a child under the age of three, in American law a child under the 
age of five, and in South African law a child under the age of seven cannot 
be held negligent or liable in delict or tort.319 It is submitted that generally 
the child's age, intellect, maturity, experience etcetera as subjective factors 
are considered when judging their conduct.320 The subjective factors may 
be considered directly or indirectly and lend to the more relaxed treatment 
applied to children, which is reasonable and justifiable. In English law the 
reasonable child test is applied.321 In South African law it must first be 
considered whether a child can be held accountable. Under accountability, 
subjective factors such as whether the child can tell the difference between 
right and wrong, experience, maturity, intellect and so on are considered.322 
Even though the age of the child may not be referred to (as in American 
law),323 the other subjective factors considered in a sense correlate with the 
child's age. In American law a child's conduct is tested against that of the 
reasonable person of his age, intelligence, maturity, and experience in 
similar circumstances.324 In French law the situation is indeed unique in that 
even though in principle the bonus pater familias standard is applied, the 
requirement of discernment (which is similar to the concept of 
accountability) has been dispensed with and the parents are generally held 
strictly liable for the conduct of children still living with them.325 Although the 
strict liability rule that applies to parents may seem harsh, it is tempered by 
the fact that almost all French families are protected by liability insurance 
cover at a minimal cost.326 Furthermore, most social institutions are insured 
against civil liability.327 It may be argued, though, that this rule is not really 
tempered as the parents or institutions have to pay for the insurance, but it 
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may be understood and regarded as reasonable where it is apparent that 
France follows a pro-victim approach, ensuring that the plaintiff receives 
compensation. 
In Anglo-American law, if an elderly driver poses a risk of harm to others as 
a result of his or her declining mental or physical abilities, then he or she is 
held to the base standard of the reasonable person and may be held 
negligent.328 In France, where the loi badinter329 is applicable, contributory 
negligence as a defence is no longer applicable to an elderly person over 
seventy years of age. A more relaxed approach seems to apply to plaintiffs 
only with regard to road accident claims in France and American law.330 As 
already mentioned,331 there is also a lack of authority on how the standard 
of the reasonable person should be applied to the elderly in South African 
law. It is submitted that in terms of a fair and reasonable common sense 
approach, the naturally declining physical and cognitive abilities of an 
elderly person should be considered in lowering the base standard of the 
reasonable person. This recommendation will be discussed further 
below.332 
In respect of persons with physical disabilities or impairments, there seems 
to be a lack of authority. However, of all the jurisdictions, American law 
seems to adopt the most sensible approach. Physical disability or 
impairment may have the effect of either lowering the base standard of the 
reasonable person or in certain instances exonerating the person from 
liability. American law specifically refers to the standard of the reasonable 
person with a similar disability.333 This standard is generally applied to 
persons where there is a loss of a motor function, such as persons who are 
blind or deaf. In these instances it is apparent that the base standard is 
lowered, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the disability. 
Naturally, the conduct of the person with a physical disability or impairment 
must still be reasonable in the context of his or her knowledge of the 
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disability or impairment.334 Van der Walt and Midgley335 provide a good 
example of a person who is blind and aware of his physical impairment. In 
this instance the person will be found negligent if he or she drives a car on 
the street and causes harm. 
In situations where a person suffers some kind of condition or physical 
disability of which he or she is unaware, such as a heart attack or sudden 
blackout, and causes harm, in Anglo-American law as well as South African 
law the person may be exonerated from liability. In Anglo-American law fault 
is absent as the heart attack or sudden blackout was unforeseeable.336 In 
South African law there is an absence of conduct337 as well as fault.338 
Where a person is aware of his or her condition or can reasonably foresee 
that he or she is prone to the condition and for example forgets to take his 
or her medication, which eventually leads to the causing of harm, generally 
the principle of "prior fault" applies and the person may be held negligent for 
not controlling the condition.339 
With regard to persons with mental impairments, of all the jurisdictions 
South African law seems to have the most lenient approach in that, 
depending on the circumstances, conduct may be absent340 and the base 
standard of the reasonable person will not even come into play if the person 
cannot be held accountable. If the person's cognitive and intellectual 
shortcomings result in him or her not being able to distinguish between right 
and wrong and act in accordance with such appreciation, then the question 
of fault does not even arise.341 In Anglo-American law a mentally impaired 
person is judged according to the base standard of the reasonable person 
despite his or her cognitive and intellectual shortcomings.342 The person 
with the mental impairment is in a sense held strictly liable and even though 
holding such a person to the base standard of the reasonable person has 
been criticised, French law seems to offer the most plausible rationale for 
this approach - that it is fair and reasonable to compensate the innocent 
plaintiff.343 With regard to French law, which generally favours strict liability, 
the dispensing with the requirement of discernment (which is similar to the 
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concept of accountability), coupled with the fact that most French people 
take out insurance to cover delictual liability, explains the more claimant-
biased approach followed in France as against the South African approach, 
for instance. 
5  Recommendations for the South African law of delict 
The South African approach to determining the negligence of a person with 
a mental impairment is commendable, in that the standard of the reasonable 
person will be applied only if the person can be held accountable. The 
person's cognitive and intellectual state of mind at the time of the delict are 
taken into consideration and if he or she cannot be held accountable, then 
the base standard of the reasonable person is not applied.344 
South African law follows the same approach as the other jurisdictions 
discussed in this contribution of raising the base standard of the reasonable 
person when it comes to experts. All the jurisdictions apply the base 
standard of the reasonable person where a person is inexperienced and in 
instances where the risk of harm is high in respect of the activity undertaken, 
such as in the case of the learner driver. This is understandable when taking 
into account the foreseeable risk of harm. It is also understandable that in 
South African law, where the foreseeable risk of harm is not appreciable, as 
in the example of the novice golfer or the inexperienced young teacher, it 
may not be fair or reasonable to judge the inexperienced person according 
to the base standard of the reasonable person. Thus, the base standard of 
the reasonable person may be lowered to take into consideration the 
subjective lack of skill, knowledge and experience of the actor.345 
Concerning children, the applicability of the concept of accountability in 
South African law is commendable. However, the criticism that a child's 
conduct cannot realistically be measured against that of an adult should be 
earnestly noted.346 The American approach follows an appealing middle 
path between the reasonable child standard and the base standard of the 
reasonable person, in that the standard applied is that of the reasonable 
person "of his own age, intelligence, and experience in similar 
circumstances."347 The age, level of maturity, knowledge, prior experience, 
whether he or she can understand the consequences of his or her actions 
and the surrounding circumstances are taken into consideration in a 
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meaningful manner.348 The approach followed in American law in respect of 
minors could also be followed in South African law. In respect of minors, 
South African law already applies the concept of accountability as a 
prerequisite for negligence349 and could apply the standard of the 
reasonable person of his or her age, intellect, level of maturity and 
experience under similar circumstances. It follows that the minor's conduct 
is not tested against the base standard of the reasonable person but is 
lowered to take into account the subjective attributes of the child relating to 
his or her age, intellect, level of maturity and experience in a more 
expressive and meaningful way. 
In respect of the elderly it is recommended that the base standard of the 
reasonable person be lowered generally to take into account their naturally 
declining physical and cognitive abilities. Barrett III350 submits that the 
"characteristics of old age are predictable and capable of diagnosis, ample 
scientific and medical authority is available" in order to determine the 
capacity of the elderly person. He351 encourages a more lenient approach 
to persons from the age of sixty-five years onwards. He explains that once 
capacity has been established, the standard of the "reasonably careful 
person of like age and similar infirmities" be applied. He352 submits though 
that as with children who undertake certain risky activities usually 
undertaken by adults (such as driving a car), the base standard of the 
reasonable person should apply to the elderly person under these 
circumstances unless out of necessity, the elderly person had no other 
choice but to undertake the risky activity (that is, driving the car under the 
circumstances). The rationale behind this base standard being applied to 
minors and the elderly is that driving a car is an inherently dangerous activity 
and due to the concerns of public interest and safety, society requires an 
exception to apply in this instance.353 Barrett III354 persuasively submits that 
from a statistical, legal and practical point of view, the law should be 
reformed to take into account the subjective naturally declining, physical and 
cognitive abilities of the elderly defendant when determining negligence. 
The elderly person should generally not be held to the base standard of the 
reasonable person. It is recommended that South African law should 
consider applying a more lenient approach when determining the 
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negligence of elderly persons to take into account their naturally declining 
physical and cognitive abilities. Again, accountability would in any event 
apply as a prerequisite for negligence. The standard of the reasonable 
person of like age and similar physical and cognitive abilities or infirmities 
could be applied to persons over the age of sixty-five years. 
In South African law, even though there is a lack of authority on how the 
standard should apply to persons with physical disabilities, one can see the 
appeal of the American approach once again, which generally uses the 
standard of the reasonable person with the same disability.355 In effect, the 
base standard of the reasonable person is lowered to take into account the 
subjective disability but is still tested objectively. South African law could 
adopt this approach. 
In instances where a person suffers some kind of condition, such as the 
example of a heart attack where the person was unaware of his or her 
condition, South African law follows a commendable approach whereby the 
elements of conduct and fault are called into question. If the conduct was 
mechanical and involuntary under the circumstances, conduct is lacking and 
fault is absent unless the principle of "prior fault" applies.356 
On a final note with regard to the recommendations and possible reform of 
the application of the standard of the reasonable person in South African 
law, Moran's357 concerns regarding our distinction and understanding of the 
concepts of normal, ordinary and reasonable behaviour should be heeded 
so as not to lead to any discrimination. Thus ordinary, natural, normal 
behaviour need not equate to reasonable behaviour in all instances. 
Furthermore, gender equality should apply and the standard of the 
reasonable person should be applied in the same manner to all genders. 
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